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1 Friedman (1953) was referring
more generally to speculation
in foreign exchange and dis-
cussed government speculation
(intervention) as a special
case. Sweeney (1997) reviews
research on the proﬁtability of
central bank intervention.
2 Humpage (1994) outlines the
institutional aspects of U.S.
intervention while Edison
(1993) reviews the extensive
literature on central bank inter-
vention.











ecent research has discovered two
seemingly contradictory facts about
U.S. intervention in foreign exchange
markets. On the one hand, extrapolative
technical trading rules trade against U.S.
foreign exchange intervention and produce
excess returns—returns in excess of nomi-
nal interest rates—during these periods,
and U.S. intervention itself, is proﬁtable
over long periods. LeBaron (1996) and
Szakmary and Mathur (1997) have shown
that excess returns to technical trading
rules are high during periods of central
bank intervention and that the technical
rules trade contrary to the direction of ofﬁ-
cial intervention. Along the same lines,
Neely and Weller (1997) have shown that
trading rules constructed by genetic pro-
grams can use information on the direc-
tion of U.S. intervention to increase their
excess returns in some exchange rates:
When the Federal Reserve is buying dol-
lars, traders following technical rules are
usually selling dollars and proﬁting hand-
somely. Some—Dooley and Shafer (1983),
Corrado and Taylor (1986), Sweeney
(1986), Friedman (1988), and Kritzman
(1989)—have interpreted these results to
conﬁrm long-held conjectures that U.S.
authorities’ intervention creates excess
returns for speculators and that public
resources are being lost to speculators.
These results certainly suggest that
investors should trade contrary to U.S.
intervention. In contrast, Leahy (1995)
has found that U.S. foreign exchange inter-
vention has been proﬁtable for U.S.
authorities, so perhaps investors would be
wise to trade with them.  
The relationship between trading-rule
returns and central bank intervention is
important because it might shed light on
the source of technical trading-rule proﬁts
that seem to contradict the efﬁcient-
markets hypothesis. The proﬁtability of
U.S. intervention operations has been
studied primarily because of Friedman’s
(1953) argument that there is a connection
between the proﬁtability of intervention
and the ability of intervention to stabilize
the market.1 This link is tenuous, however.
Salant (1974), Mayer and Taguchi (1983),
and De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and
Waldmann (1989) provide counterexamples.
How can technical traders make
excess returns when they take positions
contrary to U.S. intervention while U.S.
intervention itself is proﬁtable? On whom
is the smart money to bet? This article ﬁrst
extends recent research linking U.S. inter-
vention and trading-rule returns. It then
conﬁrms that U.S. intervention has been
proﬁtable over long periods. Finally, the
article presents some explanations, consis-
tent with the data, that may reconcile this
apparent contradiction.  
CENTRAL BANK  
INTERVENTION
Central bank intervention is the prac-
tice of monetary authorities buying and
selling currency in the foreign exchange
market to inﬂuence exchange rates. In the
United States, for example, the Federal
Reserve and the U.S. Treasury generally
collaborate on foreign exchange interven-
tion decisions, and the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York conducts operations on
behalf of both.2
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3Humpage (1998) provides
some evidence to suggest that
U.S. intervention may inﬂuence
exchange rates.
4 “The Foreign Currency Directive”
is published annually in the
Federal Reserve Bulletin with
the minutes of the ﬁrst Federal
Open Market Committee 
meeting of the year. 
5 The Federal Reserve will release
daily data on U.S. intervention
with a lag of one year for the
purpose of academic research. 
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When a central bank buys (sells) its
own currency in exchange for a foreign
currency, it decreases (increases) the
amount of its currency in circulation, low-
ering (raising) its domestic money supply.
By itself, this transaction would inﬂuence
exchange rates in the same way as ordinary
domestic open market operations; however,
most central banks routinely “sterilize”
their foreign exchange operations; that is,
they buy and sell domestic bonds to
reverse the effect of the foreign exchange
operation on the domestic money supply
(Edison, 1993). For example, if the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York bought
$100 million worth of deutschemarks
(DM) in a foreign exchange intervention,
the U.S. monetary base would increase by
$100 million in the absence of sterilization.
Other things equal, interest rates and
prices would also change. To prevent
changes to domestic interest rates and
prices, the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York would sterilize the intervention—sell
$100 million worth of government securi-
ties—and absorb the liquidity. Complete
sterilization would also require that the
foreign central bank—the Bundesbank in
the case of the DM—automatically reverse
the effect of the intervention on the foreign
money market by increasing the supply of
foreign currency through open market
operations. The net effect would be to
increase the relative supply of U.S. govern-
ment securities versus foreign securities on
the market but to leave the domestic and
foreign money supplies unchanged. 
Because fully sterilized intervention
does not affect either prices or interest
rates, it does not inﬂuence the exchange
rate directly, as does ordinary monetary
policy. There are two channels through
which ofﬁcial intervention might affect the
foreign exchange market indirectly—the
portfolio balance channel and the signaling
channel. Sterilized intervention leaves the
money supply unchanged but changes the
relative supplies of bonds denominated in
different currencies. The portfolio balance
channel theory holds that if these bonds
are imperfect substitutes, investors must
be compensated to hold the relatively
more numerous bonds with a higher
expected return. This higher expected
return must result from a change in either
the price of the bonds or the exchange
rate. The signaling channel, on the other
hand, suggests that ofﬁcial intervention
communicates or signals to the market
information about future monetary policy
or the long-run equilibrium value of the
exchange rate. Both the portfolio balance
and signaling channels provide a theoretical
transmission mechanism from sterilized
intervention to exchange rate changes.
There is little empirical evidence to
support the contention that there is a
strong inﬂuence from either channel; the
general consensus has been that any inﬂu-
ence intervention has on the exchange rate
is relatively weak and temporary.3
The Foreign Currency Directive of 
the Federal Reserve System directs
intervention to “counter disorderly market
conditions,” in cooperation with foreign
central banks, consistent with the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund Article IV, Section 1,
that forbids attempts to remedy balance-
of-payments problems by manipulating
exchange rates.4 “Disorderly market condi-
tions” are not precisely deﬁned, so the
concept is open to interpretation. Reasons
for intervention might include reducing
volatility in the market or preventing
abrupt changes in exchange rates. Alterna-
tively, a central bank might intervene to
correct “misalignments,” that is, over- or
undervaluations of the exchange rate. Such
intervention might work by communicating
information to market participants about
the long-run value of the exchange rate. 
U.S. intervention often is conducted
against a prevailing trend in the market
(“leaning against the wind”). In other
words, U.S. authorities tend to buy dollars
when the foreign exchange price of dollars
is declining. Whether the intervention
occurs during periods of high volatility 
or changes the volatility of exchange 
rates is not clear. 
Table 1 shows some summary statistics
on daily U.S. intervention data, in millions
of U.S. dollars, over the period from March
1, 1973, to December 31, 1996.5 PositiveFEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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6In the foreign exchange mar-
ket, one trade may generate
many others as traders seek to
“square” their positions before
the end of business. Therefore,
the level of intervention may
look deceptively small com-
pared to the enormous foreign
exchange market volume.
7 Neely (1997) discusses the
use and testing of technical
trading rules. 
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numbers indicate purchases of dollars;
negative numbers indicate sales of dollars.
The intervention data in the table are
described in two ways: (1) as the sum of
in-market and with-customer intervention
and (2) as solely in-market intervention.
In-market interventions are designed to
inﬂuence the exchange rate directly, while
with-customer interventions are
transactions with other government
entities that also change the relative
supplies of domestic and foreign bonds.
Adams and Henderson (1983) cite the
example of a central bank that is supplying
foreign exchange out of its reserves for its
government to repay obligations denomi-
nated in a foreign currency. The in-market
deﬁnition and the sum of in-market and
with-customer intervention deﬁnitions
produce much the same summary statistics.
In-market intervention occurred on about
16 percent of business days in the DM and
4 percent of days in the yen (JY). Because
intervention was relatively evenhanded,
with almost as many dollars bought as sold
during the period, the mean level of inter-
vention was small. When intervention did
occur, it was small—in absolute value—
relative to the size of the foreign exchange
market. The mean absolute level of in-
market intervention was about $80 million
for the DM and $130 million for the yen.
In contrast, the daily volume of transactions
in all foreign exchange markets over a typ-
ical business day was $1.2 trillion in April
1995, with the dollar involved in 83
percent of those transactions (Bank for
International Settlements, 1996).6
The last two rows show that interven-
tions tend to be clustered together in time.
The probability of non-zero in-market
intervention in the DM is only 7 percent if
there has been no intervention on the
prior day, but 44 percent if intervention
has occurred on that day. 
TECHNICAL TRADING RULES
AND U.S. INTERVENTION
A strong and consistent result in inter-
national ﬁnance is the evidence that
technical trading rules—rules that use
information on past prices to determine
trading decisions—can generate persistent
proﬁts in dollar exchange rate markets.7
This success is puzzling because it seems
to contradict the efﬁcient-markets hypoth-
esis that holds that no trading strategy
should be able to generate unusual proﬁts
on publicly available information—like
past prices—except by bearing unusual
risk. In other words, expected risk-adjusted
excess returns should be zero. Efforts to
explain the proﬁtability of trading rules as
the compensation for holding risky assets
have been largely unconvincing. Because
risk is difﬁcult to model and measure, how-
ever, it remains unclear to what degree the
positive excess returns can be explained by
risk, transactions costs, market inefﬁciencies,
or other factors. 
All technical trading rules attempt to
filter the data to discover trends in exchange
rates. So-called double moving-average
rules (MA rules) are among the most 
successful and often-studied type of
mechanical trading rule. A double moving-
average rule prescribes buying an asset—
e.g., a foreign currency-denominated bank
deposit—if a moving average of past
exchange rates over a short time window
is greater than a moving average of past
exchange rates over a longer time window.
Summary Statistics on U.S. Intervention,
March 1, 1973, to December 31, 1996
In-Market+with Customer  In-market
DM/$  JY/$  DM/$  JY/$
Number of Interventions  1198  287  971  243
Mean I | I ¹  0  5.61  2.74  11.19  4.91
Mean | I | | I ¹  0  68.32  112.55  79.65  131.23
Minimum I  –797  –555  –797  –555
Maximum I  950  800  950  800
P(I(t) ¹  0 | I(t-1) = 0)  0.08  0.02  0.07  0.02
P(I(t) ¹  0 | I(t-1) ¹  0)  0.50  0.43  0.44  0.42
NOTES: The ﬁrst two columns refer to the sum of daily in-market and with-customer 
interventions, while columns three and four refer solely to in-market interventions.  
Positive numbers indicate purchases of dollars; negative numbers indicate sales of dollars.
The second and third rows are the mean and the mean absolute level of (non-zero) inter-
vention.  The sixth and seventh rows are the probabilities of (non-zero) intervention, 
given that the previous day’s, intervention levels were zero and non-zero respectively.  
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8The signals generated by the
moving-average rule could
depend on whether the
exchange rate is deﬁned as dol-
lars per unit of foreign currency
or units of foreign currency 
per dollar. In practice, however,
the correlation in the signals
generated by the two methods
exceeds 99 percent, and the
returns are nearly identical. 
9 In this and all other exercises in
this article, transactions costs
are ignored. Past research on
technical trading rules has shown
the results to be relatively
insensitive to the inclusion or
exclusion of reasonable transac-
tions costs. Research on the
size of transactions costs in the
foreign exchange market indi-
cates that, for large transac-
tions, buying or selling $1 will
cost the trader $0.00025. 
10The form of Equation 3 is due
to the fact that the short trader
receives twice the U.S. rate of
return—from the margin
account and from the converted
DM—while losing the return to
the DM. This sum is then divided
by the gross domestic interest
rate to obtain Equation 3. 
11This deﬁnition of rt introduces a
very small approximation error
in the case of a short position.
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Conversely, if the short moving average is
less than the long moving average, the rule
instructs that the trader should sell the
asset. The length of the moving averages 
is determined by trial and error by traders.
In this article, we will follow LeBaron’s
(1996) lead and choose 1 as the length of
the short moving average and 150 as the
length of the long moving average. This
MA (1,150) rule can be written as follows: 
(1)
where St is the spot dollar price of foreign
exchange at time t.8
To determine whether the rule is prof-
itable, we assume that a trader holds an
amount of money—say $1,000—in a
margin account that collects the U.S.
interest rate. If the moving-average rule
directs the trader to buy DM, the trader
borrows $1,000, using the margin as
collateral, and converts the borrowed
money to a DM investment at the spot
exchange rate. The dollar rate of return on
the DM investment is the product of the
overnight German interest rate and the
rate of appreciation of the DM against the
dollar. The investor must also pay interest
on the dollars that were borrowed. The
gross excess return to this strategy over
simply holding the margin account is9
(2) 
where it
DM is the German overnight
interest rate, St+1/St is the appreciation of
the DM against the dollar overnight, and it
$
is the U.S. overnight interest rate. If the
trader receives a signal to sell the DM, he
borrows $1,000 worth of DM—using the
$1,000 in his margin account as security—
converts those DM to a dollar-denominated
bank account and obtains the following
gross excess return—over holding a margin
account—on the short DM position:10
(3) 
The continuously compounded (log)
excess returns are denoted by ztrt, where zt
is an indicator variable taking the values of
+1 for a long position and -1 for a short
position, and rt is deﬁned as11
(4) 
The total excess return, r, for a trading
rule over the period from time zero to time
T is given by:
(5) 
To test the proﬁtability of the MA
(1,150) rule, we obtained daily noon
(Eastern time) buying rates in New York
City for the $/DM and $/JY exchange rates.
These data are available in the H.10
Federal Reserve statistical release. The
Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
provided the daily overnight interest rates,
collected at 9:00 a.m. London time. The
exchange rate data and interest rate data
run from March 1, 1973, through January
2, 1997, the ﬁrst business day of 1997. 
Panel A of Table 2 shows the results of
testing the MA (1,150) rule on the $/DM
and $/JY exchange rate over the sample
period. The rule was very proﬁtable,
producing a 5.6 percent annual return 
for the $/DM and an 8.4 percent annual
return for the $/JY. The returns are highly
signiﬁcant statistically, whether we use
conventional asymptotic signiﬁcance levels
or bootstrap the returns to obtain small-
sample critical values. The rules trade four
to seven times a year and produce very
high returns relative to volatility with
Sharpe ratios of 0.53 and 0.86,
respectively. In comparison, the Sharpe
ratio to a buy-and-hold strategy for the
S&P 500 over a similar period is 0.3.
These results are consistent with past
results in the technical trading rule litera-
ture, which suggests that following
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moving-average trading rules can generate
excess returns that are difﬁcult to explain
in terms of standard risk measures.12
Many authors—Dooley and Shafer
(1983), Corrado and Taylor (1986),
Sweeney (1986), Friedman (1988), and
Kritzman (1989)—have cited the existence
of central bank intervention in foreign
exchange markets as a potential explanation
for the proﬁtability of technical trading
rules. The rationale for that theory is as
follows: Because intervention is conducted
to maintain orderly market conditions or
perhaps to achieve macroeconomic goals
such as price stability or full employment,
rather than to make money, central banks
may be willing to take a loss on their
trading. LeBaron (1996) found that most
trading-rule proﬁts were generated on the
day before in-market U.S. intervention.
Szakmary and Mathur (1997) examine the
link between trading-rule returns and
proxies for central bank intervention in
the form of monthly foreign exchange
reserves. They ﬁnd that for three of ﬁve
exchange rates, including the $/DM and
$/JY, “trading-rule proﬁts different than
zero can be fully explained by ‘leaning
against the wind intervention’ by central
banks” (Szakmary and Mathur (1997), 
p. 531). They speculate that trading-rule
proﬁts may represent a transfer from central
banks to technical traders. The monthly  fre-
quency of the data used by Szakmary and
Mathur (1997), however, limits the infor-
mation one can gather from their exercise. 
To investigate this claim, we will
follow LeBaron’s procedure and selectively
examine the trading rule results after
removing those returns from day t  to t+1
for which intervention was non-zero on
t+1. We will also examine results after
removing returns from day t  to t+1  for
which intervention was non-zero on day t.
According to Goodhart and Hesse (1993)
and Humpage (1998), most intervention is
conducted before noon in New York,
before the close of the European markets.
Because the exchange rate data were
collected at noon, intervention on day t
should have its greatest effect on returns
from t-1  to t  or from t  to t+1.13
Panel B of Table 2 shows the results of
the rule with the returns from t  to t+1
removed if there is intervention on day t.
There is some evidence that the returns are
12See Neely (1997) for more
extensive discussion of risk
measures, including the 
CAPM beta. 
13LeBaron used data from DRI,
collected at 9:00 a.m. Eastern
time prior to October 9, 1986,
and at 11:00 a.m. Eastern
time to the present. 
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MA (1,150) Trading Rule
Results, March 1, 1973 to
December 31, 1996.
$/DM $/JY
Panel A:  N  5982  5982
All observations  100*AR  5.64  8.41
100*std.  0.67  0.62
t  statistic  2.60  4.20
Sharpe  0.53  0.86
trades per year  6.84  4.49
p-value  0.00  0.00
Panel B:  N  5016  5740
Observations excluding  100*AR  4.54  8.01
days of U.S.  100*std.  0.67  0.61
intervention  t  statistic  1.91  3.98
Sharpe  0.43  0.83
trades per year  7.35  4.59
p-value  0.01  0.00
Markov p-value  0.12  0.17
Panel C:  N  5015  5739
Observations excluding  100*AR  1.19  5.50
days prior to U.S.  100*std.  0.64  0.60
intervention  t  statistic  0.52  2.78
Sharpe  0.12  0.58
trades per year  7.46  4.68
p-value  0.16  0.04
Markov p-value  0.00  0.00
NOTES:  N denotes the number of observations.  The difference
between the number of observations in panels A and B is not
equal to the number of in-market interventions because some
interventions occurred on days when the exchange rate was
missing.  100*AR is the annual return in percentage terms, and
100*Std is the standard deviation of the series in percentage
terms.  The t  statistic tests the null hypothesis that the mean
excess return is zero. P-value is the fraction of randomly drawn
returns that would have a mean at least as large as the mean
return generated by the trading rule.  Panel B excludes returns
from t  to t+1  when the U.S. authorities intervene on day t.
Panel C excludes returns from t-1  to t  when the U.S. authorities
intervene on day t.  The row labeled Markov p-value is the
fraction of samples with simulated intervention series whose
returns were lower than those produced by removing actual
intervention series on either the day of intervention or the day
prior to intervention.
Table 2FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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what more when data similar
to those in LeBaron (1996)
are used. Results also differ
from those obtained by
LeBaron because of the 
longer sample period. 
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lower when there is no intervention on
day t. With these returns removed, the
mean annual return for the $/DM rule was
110 basis points lower and that of the $/JY
rule was 40 basis points lower. 
Panel C of Table 2 shows the analogous
results on returns from t  to t+1  conditional
on no intervention on day t+1. The timing
was that used by LeBaron (1996). Mean
returns are about 3 percentage points
lower when there is no intervention on
day t+1  than they would be with all obser-
vations.14 The returns to the $/DM rule 
are no longer statistically signiﬁcant and
Sharpe ratios are much lower. Could this
result be due to random removal of returns?
No. LeBaron shows, and we conﬁrm in
this exercise, that randomly removing
returns is very unlikely to reduce returns
as much as removing observations of days
before intervention. In panels B and C of
Table 2, the last row shows the fraction of
samples with randomly removed returns in
which the simulated returns were as low as
the returns in which the actual intervention
data had been removed. The simulated
return series were created by generating
simulated intervention series by a calibrated
Markov process and removing returns in
which the generated intervention was 
non-zero on day t+1. 
Does U.S. intervention tend to occur
with or against the signals generated by the
technical trading rules?  The ﬁrst row of
Table 3 shows the fraction of intervention
days (day t+1) on which the U.S. authorities
were buying dollars on t+1  while the technical
rule signals (day t) also recommended
buying dollars.  This fraction was 27 percent
for the $/DM and 13 percent for the $/JY.
The second row of Table 3 shows the frac-
tion of the time that the technical signal
was of the same as the return to holding
dollars.  These ﬁgures were 59 percent for
the $/DM and 69 percent for the $/JY.
These are the fractions of the times that
the technical trading rule was making
money on days of intervention for each
currency. The third row shows that
intervention and the return to holding the
foreign currency were of the same sign
only 27 percent of the time for the DM and
30 percent of the time for the JY. In other
words, intervention is generally against the
position taken by technical traders; the
technical traders are guessing the sign of
the excess return correctly, and intervention
tends to be in the unproﬁtable direction—
at least in the short term. Taken at face
value, these correlations suggest that traders
should bet against U.S. intervention.
There are several ways to interpret
these results. First, the U.S. authorities
may be creating predictable price patterns
in otherwise efﬁcient markets, handing
money to technical traders. Second, ofﬁcial
intervention and predictable trends in for-
eign exchange markets may be driven by
some common factor. 
The argument that the proﬁts of tech-
nical trading rules are merely the result of
transfers of money from central bankers to
technical traders requires explanation. Sza-
kmary and Mathur (1997) propose the
following mechanism: Suppose that the
central bank sought to smooth adjustment
of exchange rates to new equilibrium
levels. The central bank could lean against
the wind and—if intervention proved effec-
tive—slow the adjustment of exchange
rates. This tactic could enable technical
traders to make money by buying from the
central bank as it was selling. In contrast,
in the absence of central bank intervention,
the exchange rate would adjust completely
before the technical traders could act. 
It is important to understand that U.S.
intervention may not be causing  the appar-
Sign Agreement
$/DM  s.e.  $/JY  s.e.
Observations  971  –  243  –
z(t), I(t+1)  0.27  0.01  0.13  0.02
z(t), r(t)  0.59  0.02  0.69  0.03
I(t+1), r(t)  0.27  0.01  0.30  0.03
NOTES:  Columns 2 and 4 indicate the fraction of the days of U.S. in-market intervention
in which the signs of the intervention (on day t+1), the signs of the technical trading rule
signal (on day t) and the signs of the return to holding dollars (from t  to t+1) were equal.
Columns 3 and 5 are the standard errors of those estimates. 
Table 3FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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ently higher excess returns to trading rules
but may merely be associated  with them. Both
may be driven by a common factor. LeBaron
(1996) and Szakmary and Mathur (1997)
consider this idea carefully and search for a
common factor driving both the intervention
and the returns to the trading rules. While
neither study ﬁnds evidence of such a factor,
each is careful not to rule out this interpre-
tation. Fully resolving this issue is beyond
the scope of this article. The fact that both
LeBaron (1996) and the results presented
here ﬁnd that the highest returns precede
intervention argues that intervention  is not
causing the returns. We are content to doc-
ument the fact that extrapolative trading rules
tend to trade against U.S. intervention and
to make excess returns during these periods.
THE PROFITABILITY  
OF U.S. INTERVENTION
The goal of foreign exchange intervention
is to maintain orderly market conditions
or—perhaps—to assist in achieving macro-
economic goals like price stability or full
employment. Therefore, it cannot be empha-
sized strongly enough that the proﬁtability
of foreign exchange intervention is not a
necessary condition for the intervention to
be justiﬁed. Nevertheless, monetary author-
ities have also been concerned with careful
stewardship of public funds (Federal Open
Market Committee, 1990). The results of
the previous section, showing that technical
trading rules take positions contrary to the
intervention conducted by the U.S. author-
ities, raise questions about the proﬁtability
of that intervention. Leahy (1995), however,
shows that U.S. foreign exchange interven-
tion operations have made economically
signiﬁcant excess returns over the period
from March 1973 through December 1992.
This section reviews and extends those results.
How does one calculate the proﬁtability
of past intervention operations? We can
determine the present value of a past inter-
vention by comparing the actual current
value of the assets held by U.S. monetary
authorities to the value of the portfolio
that would have existed in the absence of
that intervention. For example, if the U.S.
authorities bought $1 million worth of U.S.
dollar-denominated securities in exchange
for an equal amount of DM securities on
January 1, 1980, the value of that intervention
on January 2, 1980, would be the overnight
return to the dollar securities less the
overnight return that the U.S. authorities




1/1/80 is the U.S. dollar interest rate
prevailing on January 1, 1980, is the
DM interest rate and 
is the rate of appreciation of the DM against
the dollar from January 1 to January 2, 1980.
Of course the return to the DM asset is the
opportunity cost of the intervention. The
value of the intervention on January 1, 1997,
would be determined by the stream of interest
earned on the dollar-denominated asset
minus the interest and currency apprecia-
tion—or depreciation—that would have been
earned on the DM assets that were sold on
January 1, 1980: 
Conversely, if the U.S. authorities intervene
to sell dollars, they equivalently buy foreign
exchange. The value of such an intervention
is determined by the return to the foreign
asset less the return to holding dollar-
denominated assets. The current value
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(proﬁtability) of all past intervention oper-
ations may be calculated by summing the
current value of these past interventions: 
(8)
where the proﬁt is in millions of U.S. dollars
and It is the amount of U.S. ofﬁcial foreign
exchange intervention on day t  in millions
of U.S. dollars. 
The expression for the proﬁtability of
intervention operations is closely related
but not identical to the expression for the
returns to following the technical trading
rule given in Equation 4. The expression
for the technical trading-rule return is the
arithmetic mean of an approximation to
continuously compounded  returns  for traders
who are switching between equally-sized
long and short positions according to the
signals of the trading rule. The approximate
excess overnight return on each day’s posi-
tion is evaluated, and the mean of those
returns is calculated and reported. In con-
trast, the expression for the proﬁtability of the
U.S. ofﬁcial intervention operations is the
dollar increase  in the value of assets held
by the U.S. authorities on January 1, 1997,
caused by interventions of varying sizes. 
Leahy (1995) examined the proﬁtability
of in-market and with-customer U.S. inter-
ventions  in DM and JY from March 1, 1973,
through December 31, 1992.15 While
emphasizing that his calculations were
only approximations—exact transaction
prices and interest rates used in the inter-
vention portfolio were unavailable—Leahy
(1995) concluded that past DM operations
would have increased the value of the port-
folio  held by the U.S. authorities by over
$12.3 billion as of January 1, 1993, and
operations in the JY would have increased  the
value by over $4.2 billion. 
A subsequent revision to the intervention
data and extending the intervention sample
to December 31, 1996, does not change
Leahy’s conclusions substantially.16 Table 4
shows that intervention operations in the
DM earned almost $14.5 billion, and those
in the JY made almost $6.5 billion for the
U.S. authorities. Cumulative intervention
was almost $82 billion in DM and about
$32 billion in JY. Intervention has been rel-
atively  even-handed, with the U.S. authorities
buying and selling almost equal amounts
of dollars. Net intervention was about $6.7











































15This exercise follows Leahy’s
assumptions that U.S. dollar-
denominated assets would
have earned the 3-month T-bill
rate and that German assets
would have earned the German
3-month interbank rate less 25
basis points. Japanese yen-
denominated assets would
have earned the “over-2-
month-end” loan rate prior to
March 2, 1979, and the 3-
month Gensaki rate after that
date. Interest rates obtained
over weekends and holidays
are set equal to those obtained
the prior business day.
16The author thanks Michael P.
Leahy for assistance in verifying
the intervention data used in
this article. 
Results of U.S. Of cial Foreign  
Exchange Intervention
$/DM  $/JY
Cumulative net intervention  6716  785
Cumulative gross intervention  81844  32302
Terminal dollar position  36864  –970
Foreign currency position 1  –22367  7407
Foreign currency position 2  –34416  857544
Proﬁts  14497  6437
Exchange rate as of 1/1/97  1.5387  115.77
Proﬁts if $ is 20% higher  18225  5202
Proﬁts if $ is 20% lower  8906  8289
% right  0.63  0.82
# interventions  1198  287
NOTES: The ﬁrst row is the cumulative net intervention 
while the second is gross intervention 
The proﬁts (row 6) are the sum of the terminal dollar position
(row 3) and the terminal foreign currency position, in dollars
(row 4).  The terminal foreign currency position, in dollars, and
in the foreign currency are in rows 4 and 5, respectively.  Row
7 shows the exchange rate as of 1/1/97 in units of foreign
currency per dollar.  Rows 8 and 9 show the robustness of the
proﬁtability results to a 20 percent swing in the terminal value
of the exchange rate.  Row 10 shows the percentage of inter-
ventions that increased terminal proﬁts. The ﬁnal row shows
the total number of days in which the sum of in-market and
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Figure 1 updates results presented in
Leahy (1995) on the proﬁtability of U.S.
intervention in the $/DM market. The top
panel shows the cumulative contribution
of intervention operations to the value of
the U.S. authorities’ portfolio on January 2,
1997, the ﬁrst business day of 1997. Inter-
vention operations in the late 1970s, late
1985, and the late 1980s were the most
proﬁtable. The paucity of interventions
during 1981-84 and 1992-96 produces the
ﬂatness of the graph during those periods.
The second panel shows cumulative inter-
ventions in the DM market; there were
substantial purchases of dollars in the 
DM market in the late 1970s and 1990s
and substantial sales in about 1980 and
again in the late 1980s. Finally, the third
panel shows the DM/$ exchange rate 
over the period. 
Of course, the excess return to past
intervention activities as of January 1, 1997,
depends on the value of the exchange  rate
on that date. To test the robustness of the
results to swings in the value of the exchange
rate, we again follow Leahy’s procedure and
recalculate the proﬁts under two counter-
factuals: (1) that the foreign exchange value
of the dollar was 20 percent  higher than it
actually was; (2) that the dollar’s value was
20 percent lower than it actually was. These
swings still leave the minimum proﬁts of
the U.S. authorities  at more than $8.9 bil-
lion for the DM and more than $5 billion
for the JY. These results suggest that that
the U.S. authorities’  intervention activities
have made signiﬁcant  economic proﬁts
over the period covering March 1973
through December 1996.17
RECONCILING THE RESULTS
The results on technical trading rules
and foreign exchange intervention, described
above, indicate that technical traders make
a substantial portion of their proﬁts on
days of foreign exchange intervention by
U.S. authorities, and the positions the
technical traders hold are usually contrary
to the direction of the intervention. This
ﬁnding seems to suggest that U.S. foreign
exchange intervention must lose money, so
the smart money bets against it. On the
other hand, the results outlined in the pre-
vious section show that U.S. intervention
has generated excess proﬁts for the
intervention authorities over the same
time period. In other words, trading in the
same relative size and direction as U.S.
intervention operations would have been
proﬁtable. This section explains these
apparently contradictory results by referring
to the varying magnitudes of interventions
and returns and the differing return horizons
of ofﬁcial intervention operations and
technical trading rules. 
Before discussing the reasons why the
results are not contradictory, one should
note that there are several procedural dif-
ferences between Leahy (1995) and
LeBaron (1996): They evaluated the prof-
itability of positions in slightly different
ways, and they used slightly different mea-
sures for exchange rates, interest rates, and
central bank intervention. These changes
in the procedures or data do not alter the
conclusions that extrapolative trading
rules make positive excess returns in posi-
tions contrary to ofﬁcial intervention but
that U.S. foreign exchange intervention is
ultimately proﬁtable. 
First, it is possible for two rules with
constant position sizes to trade against
each other most of the time and still make
money. Panel A of Table 5 shows a simple
numerical example of two rules with con-
stant-sized positions and constant-sized
returns that disagree with each other most
of the time, yet each trades proﬁtably most
of the time and each makes money. The
table shows the return to a dollar position
in column 2, while the signals from the
technical trading rule and the intervention
are in columns 3 and 6, respectively. These
signals determine the sign, but not the
magnitude, of the respective positions
(columns 4 and 7). In this example, each
of the rules just breaks even when the two
disagree but each makes positive returns
when they agree. This simple example
cannot explain the facts of intervention
and technical trading-rule proﬁts, however.
While Table 4 shows that 63 percent of
DM interventions and 82 percent of JY
17Sweeney (1997) advocates
adjusting central bank interven-
tion proﬁts for risk and discuss-
es testing those proﬁts for
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interventions eventually made positive
proﬁts, only 45 percent of DM interventions
and 50 percent of JY interventions 
made positive proﬁts on the ﬁrst day 
after intervention. 
A second possibility is that varying
position sizes and/or varying return sizes
can permit a trading strategy (intervention)
to be proﬁtable while being on the unprof-
itable side of the market most of the time
and usually at odds with another proﬁtable
strategy (technical trading). Panel B of
Table 5 provides a simple numerical example
in which the technical trading rule is right
67 percent of the time.  The intervention
rule is right 33 percent of the time.  Both
make positive excess returns, but the two
never  agree with each other’s signals. The
intervention rule makes positive excess
returns because the magnitude of the inter-
vention is unusually large for the period  in
which the sign of the intervention  is in the
proﬁtable direction. A similar example
could be constructed in which the interven-
tion  position size is constant, but the
intervention rule could make positive
excess returns while being unproﬁtable
most of the time, if it is proﬁtable during
the periods with large returns. This example,
by itself, does not explain the proﬁtability
of intervention, however. On average, proﬁts
are negative on the day after DM interven-
tion and only very slightly positive on the
day after JY intervention. 
A third reason why the results may not
be in contradiction is that the investment
horizons for the technical traders and the
U.S. authorities may differ. That is, the
technical traders could be making excess
returns trading contrary to U.S. intervention
over a relatively short horizon after the
intervention occurs—closing out their
position before positive returns have
accrued to the intervention position. That
is, the U.S. authorities might be taking a
long view, perhaps losing money for short
periods after the intervention but beneﬁting
from a long-run tendency for cumulative
returns to the intervention position to be
positive. When we compare the average
length of a position in a currency for tech-
nical rules and ofﬁcial interventions, we
conclude that this may be the case. Table 2
shows that the technical rules trade about
four to seven times per year or, equivalently,
that the average position is held for only
two to three months before it is reversed.
In contrast, the second panel of Figure 1
Hypothetical Numerical Examples
TTR  CBI
TTR  Position  TTR  CBI  Position  CBI
Period  $ Return  Signal  Size  Return  Signal  Size  Return
Panel A  1  –1  Buy  +1  –1  Sell  –1  +1
2  –1  Sell  –1  +1  Buy  +1  –1
3  +1  Buy  +1  +1  Buy  +1  +1
67% right  Proﬁt=1  67%right  Proﬁt=1
Panel B  1  +1  Buy  +1  +1  Sell  –0.5  –0.5
2  –1  Sell  –1  +1  Buy  +0.5  –0.5
3  +1  Sell  –1  –1  Buy  2  2
total  67% right  Proﬁt=1  33% right  Proﬁt=1
NOTES:  Column 2 is the return to a dollar position, while columns 3 and 6 are the signals from the TTR and the intervention, respectively.
These signals determine the sign, but not the magnitude, of the respective positions (columns 4 and 7).   The returns to the rules shown in
columns 5 and 8 are the products of the returns to the dollar positions (column 2) and the signed positions (4 and 7). 
Table 5shows that cumulative intervention in the
DM was positive between 1978 and 1989
and negative between 1989 and the end of
1994. That is, (cumulative) intervention
positions tend to be maintained for years
before they are effectively netted out by
intervention in the opposite direction. 
To further examine the conjecture that
U.S. authorities make excess proﬁts by
trading with long-run trends in exchange
rates, we require some measure of 
the long-run tendency of exchange rate
returns. We can calculate such a long-
run tendency in a crude way with
reference to purchasing power parity
(PPP), which holds that changes in the
exchange rate may be explained by differ-
ences in countries’ inﬂation rates.18 That
is, the dollar will tend to depreciate against
the DM to the extent that U.S. inﬂation
exceeds  German inﬂation. Of course, 
this method ignores the contribution 
of interest rate differentials on exchange
rate returns. 
18The use of the long-run tenden-
cy terminology does not imply
that foreign exchange markets
are in disequilibrium in the
short run, merely that there
may be a long-run tendency for
equilibrium exchange rates to
return to PPP-implied values. 
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NOTES: The function in the left panel is the mean proﬁt after n days over all interventions that occurred n or more days before the end
of the sample. Indexing such interventions by k and denoting the date of the kth intervention by kt, the nth observation is:









































. .To construct the simple PPP-based
measure of the long-run tendency of the
exchange rate, we ﬁrst regress monthly
domestic and foreign price series on a 
constant, on a time trend, and on lagged
prices to obtain predicted values for each
price series. We then create daily foreign
and domestic price series by linear
interpolating daily predicted values from
the monthly predicted values. We predict
daily values for the long-run tendency 
of the exchange rate with a regression of
actual daily exchange rates on the interpo-
lated foreign and domestic daily price
series. The third panel of Figure 1 shows
that this crude measure of long-run tenden-
cies seems to ﬁt the $/DM exchange rate
data well. 
The third and fourth panels of Figure 1
also seem to show that the U.S. authorities
tend to buy dollars when the price of dollars
in terms of DM is below its long-run
tendency and sell dollars when the DM
price of dollars is above its long-run
tendency. Indeed, the heaviest interven-
tions—1978-79, 1985, and 1994-95—
look to be associated with some of the
largest deviations from the PPP-implied
value of the exchange rate. This result 
suggests that one rationale for ofﬁcial U.S.
foreign exchange intervention may be to
correct perceived misalignment (large
undervaluations or overvaluations) of the
dollar, and that the intervention may be
proﬁtable over the long horizon because it
tends to buy low and sell high. Contingency
analysis of intervention and the sign of
deviation from long-run equilibrium
corroborates that most ofﬁcial intervention
in both the DM and JY markets is stabilizing
in the sense of being in the direction of
long-run equilibrium.19 For example,
intervention is in the “stabilizing” direction
52 percent of the time for the DM and 63
19The word “stabilizing” is used
for brevity in this paragraph to
describe any intervention that
buys below long-run equilibrium
or sells above long-run equilibri-
um.  Use of this word does not
imply that the intervention
inﬂuences the exchange rate in
any way.
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Mean Cumulative Returns to the MA (1,150) Rule on $/DM
Data by Investment Horizonpercent of the time for the JY. Considering
only interventions larger in absolute value
than the mean absolute non-zero interven-
tion strengthens this conclusion: 72 percent
and 77 percent of “large” DM and JY inter-
ventions, respectively, are in the stabilizing
direction. Reﬁning the criteria further—to
also include only interventions in which
the dollar was more than 2 percent  away
from its equilibrium value—pushes the 
proportion  of DM interventions in the 
stabilizing direction to 74 percent and 
the corresponding proportion of JY inter-
ventions  to 90 percent. 
How proﬁtable is U.S. intervention as
a function of the time since the intervention?
The top panel of Figure 2 shows the mean
cumulative proﬁts to U.S. interventions in
DM as a function of the investment horizon
using weighted proﬁts.  Larger interventions
receive proportionately more weight—and
equally weighted proﬁts—proﬁts to all
interventions receive the mean absolute
intervention weight. The bottom panel 
of Figure 2 displays the information in the 
top panel over the ﬁrst 250 days.20  The
weighted proﬁts are not signiﬁcantly nega-
tive at investment horizons of less than 
18 years (4,500 days /250 business days in
a year), and they turn signiﬁcantly positive
after four weeks (20 days). In contrast, the
equally weighted proﬁts are often negative
at all horizons and are always negative at
horizons of less than 30 weeks (150 days).
In other words, the U.S. authorities often
intervene in an unproﬁtable direction—
over a horizon of months—but when the
product of the intervention position and
the cumulative return is large, the position
is much more likely to produce positive
excess proﬁts, even over a horizon of a few
months. The results for the JY interventions
show no tendency for larger interventions
to be more proﬁtable at short horizons, but
such interventions do tend to be more
proﬁtable over the length of the sample. 
Figure 2 can be misleading, however.
One might think that because larger inter-
ventions—positive or negative—are slightly
more likely to be proﬁtable, and larger
returns are also positively associated with
proﬁtable interventions, then total proﬁts
from intervention would have been lower
if all the interventions had been of average
size. This would be incorrect. There is a
negative association between the size of
intervention and the magnitude of returns
that offsets the positive association between
the size of interventions and the likelihood
of the interventions being proﬁtable. 
In contrast to the results for inter-
vention, Figure 3 shows that the mean
cumulative returns to the MA (1,150) rule
on $/DM data are positive at all investment
horizons. Again, the top panel shows all
investment horizons (no position is held
over 550 days and few are held longer than
150 days), while the bottom panel shows
the performance over the ﬁrst 250 days. 
CONCLUSION
Recent research in international
ﬁnance has turned up a correlation
between returns to technical trading rules
and periods of central bank intervention.
Speciﬁcally, technical trading rules tend to
trade contrary to the direction of U.S.
intervention, and returns to the technical
rules are unusually high during, and prior
to, periods of central bank intervention.
This phenomenon might suggest that U.S.
interventions in the foreign exchange
market lose money. The best evidence,
however, is that U.S. foreign exchange
intervention has been proﬁtable over the
same sample period. Does a smart trader
bet with U.S. intervention or against it?
This article resolves the apparent
contradiction between these facts by
showing that the proﬁts on ofﬁcial U.S.
intervention come both because of a much
longer investment horizon than the
technical rules and because proﬁtable
interventions are more likely than unprof-
itable interventions to involve both large
interventions and large cumulative
returns. 
Future research on this topic will examine
the source of the link between trading-rule
proﬁts and central bank intervention. In
particular, does intervention create trading-
rule proﬁts or are both driven by some
common process? 
JULY/AUGUST 1998
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20There are roughly 250 business
days in a calendar year.REFERENCES
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